Introduction
It is not uncommon to hear a person say that they hate losing more than they appreciate winning. Many people actually find losing to be more psychologically impactful and influential when compared to winning. This phenomenon is a result of the theory of loss aversion, which takes effect in almost everything we do as consumers. This paper will examine loss aversion and how professional golfers are affected by this phenomenon while participating and competing at the highest level. The paper will also address ways to reduce the impact of loss aversion and further recommend ways for the people to understand the phenomenon and improve decision-making .
Loss Aversion Explained
Prospect theory was originally founded and named by Kahneman and Tversky, which included the ideas of both loss aversion and the endowment effect and their ability to influence consumers and overall consumer behavior. This paper will narrow the lens of prospect theory to only address loss aversion and its more specific effect on consumer behavior. Loss aversion is the phenomenon that people are affected more by a loss than by a gain of the same value. It is said that when people already have an item, typically money, they value it to a higher standard and are less willing to give it up even if it meant possibly earning a net gain of slightly more.1 It is thought that the pain of losing is seen as twice as powerful psychologically in comparison to the pleasure of gaining the same object or money. It is also believed that people are more willing to engage in risk if the that risk will avoid a loss rather than result in a gain.2 To expand on that idea, even if something were to have the same value, consumers would feel much more strongly and bear more pain when losing that same value than if they were to gain that same thing.
Examples and Errors in Decision Making
An example of this phenomena taking effect is when people are offered a prepaid commission for selling televisions versus earning commission on each television sold. Even though choosing to make commission on a per-TV basis rather than a prepaid amount of money would result in more profit, most salespeople tend to take the money upfront because it changes their level of ownership.1 Because of the fact that they already possess the money, they are less willing to give it up even though earning commission for every TV sold would result in a $2 further net gain. The salespeople feel more strongly not losing the $10 in the prepaid commission scenario than achieving this overall net gain of $12.1 This error is made more often than not in human behavior because of the attachment to already possessing an item and the fear and anxiety of losing that item weighs heavier, with much less regard to the possibility of gaining more.
Another example would be an employer adding 10% of an employee’s salary in a long term saving account.1 If the employee only choses to match with 5% of their salary, they will see the company remove the extra 5% and meet them in the middle. This principle off loss aversion is that money people do not get is not valued the same as money that is taken away, resulting in a larger psychological impact.1 In this case, employees are leaving money on the table but fail to recognize it until the money is already existent and then taken away. Ultimately, loss aversion results in a multitude of human errors, leading to less profitable and practical decisions and allowing for emotion to overwhelm sensible choices.
Applying Loss Aversion to Professional Golf
The Professional Golf Association (PGA) holds a multitude of events (40-50 per year) with over 100 golfers participating in each of these events3. These professionals are elite at what they do, and it is no surprise that loss aversion, a part of behavioral economics, effects these golfers during their tournaments and play. Whether it be on the green attempting to make putts specifically or when holes are rated with a lower par (par 4 versus par 5), decisions, aggressiveness of shots, and overall success can be seen through loss aversion.
Multiple studies have examined the role of loss aversion in the way professional golfers approach their game. Because golf courses around the world are rated differently, the common reference point is par. Golfers move up and down from that score, going above par and below par with the goal of shooting the least amount of strokes as possible. Golfers make decisions based on aggressiveness and their own perception of par and what they may gain or lose from every single shot. The following sections of the paper will go on to explain the different ways loss aversion appears in the game of golf, both in putting and the approach to a hole’s rating, identifying why golfers approach the game in this way, and providing multiple recommendations to combat the issue of loss aversion in golf.
The following graph represents the commonality of a golfer’s emotional response to making a one shot gain or loss.4

Figure 1. Value Function of Loss Aversion in Golf
Value Function Interpreted
As the figure demonstrates, golfers feel more pain when going a stroke above par rather than going a stroke under par. It is also important to note that this graph has par as the reference point in which golfers can gain and lose. This figure shows how players are more likely to focus more on par putts and putts that put players above par to avoid suffering further loss.4
Putting
According to loss aversion, golfers, in theory, should place more emphasis on putts that would result in a loss (gaining a stroke) versus a gain (losing a stroke). Although golfers strive to hit all putts accurately, findings that have controlled for distance, line, slope, and other important variables when it comes to putts, golfers do hit birdie putts (gains) less accurate and less hard than par putts (losses).4 The golfers, even in these very high-stakes settings, are more concerned with saving par, which would otherwise result in a loss barring a miss, then making birdie, which would result in a gain. According to this information, golfers on average miss 2-4% more birdie putts than par putts, which results in higher scores and worse performance, ultimately resulting in finishes lower on the leaderboard and less prize money.4
Hole Ratings
Another study was conducted at two golf courses who have hosted the prestigious U.S. Open on multiple occasions, Pebble Beach Golf Club and Oakmont Country Club. Over the course of time, the makeup of holes have not been altered materially, but only changed from a grade of par 5 to par 4.3 Even through the advancement in technology and player skill, golfers were still more susceptible to decrease their scores on the two holes that were changed by par rating and not materially while no other holes experienced this same, loss averse trend.3 Because the reference point of the holes in question changed, the golfers approach to the hole did as well, so that they would experience less of a loss.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are specific approaches golfers should take to remove loss averse decisions in application to their game.
- Players should base their decisions and aggressiveness on overall score and not the reference point of par. Removing par as the baseline will help golfers shoot lower scores and focus on gaining putts, like birdies, rather than saving par.
- Players need to remove emotion from certain shots. It would be more beneficial to look at every shot as the same and strive to finish in the least amount of strokes possible, without putting extra emotional strain on specific shots.
- Finally, each shot/stroke should be looked at purely analytically. Golfers understand their own game well and have caddies to help. Approaching each shot by understanding a gain will outweigh a loss in terms of final score and prize money will increase overall success.
Conclusion
Loss aversion plays a significant role in most of human behavior but also in the way that professional golfers approach their own game. Golfers are more prone to make putts that save par rather than gaining putt like a birdie.4 Golfers are also more susceptible to shoot lower scores on holes rated of a par 4 than a par 5 even without the hole being materially changed.3 However, by changing the reference point, removing emotion, and taking a more analytical approach to shots, golfers can remove loss aversion in their play.
References
- Luong, L. (2013, April 7). 2.6 Loss aversion and the
endowment effect [Video file]. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpiGVWO-C64 - Loss aversion. BehavioralEconomics.com | The BE Hub. (2022, September 14). Retrieved from https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/loss-aversion/
- Elmore, R., & Urbaczewski, A. (2021). Loss Aversion in Professional Golf. Journal of Sports Economics, 22(2), 202–217.
- Pope, Devin G., and Maurice E. Schweitzer. (2011). Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes. American Economic Review, 101(1): 129–57.
My Thoughts and Ideas:
This is a paper I wrote in college in a judgement and analytical reasoning class. I thought it was a perfect time to take another approach and apply what can be learned above in how it changes the game of baseball.
My first thoughts were how it affects managerial decisions. Managers have a multitude of strategies and dozens of decisions to make throughout one, 9-inning game. Compile that over a 162 game season, that is almost 2000 decisions made throughout the course of a season where more wins undoubtedly matter. Just as golfers exhibit a stronger emotional reaction to maintaining par than making birdie, managers might prioritize tying the game over taking the lead. For instance, when down by one run late in the game, a manager might choose to bunt a runner to second base, sacrificing an out to increase the chance of tying the game, even if this strategy decreases the likelihood of scoring multiple runs and taking the lead. Although this does not include the execution from the hitter and how the defense reacts and finishes the play, this is where we see analytics and loss aversion have influence over decisions in baseball.
This can also be seen in pitchers, which is where I would like to say I have the most experience. Some pitchers may approach innings differently when facing a situation where giving up a run could cost their team the lead. Think of late-relief, high-leverage at bats, like the ones we saw countless of in the 2024 postseason. In such moments, pitchers, and I know I have fallen prey to this, might avoid taking aggressive risks, such as throwing challenging pitches like a high fastball or a perfectly located sweeper that could lead to strikeouts but also have a higher margin for error. As a result they might rely on safer pitches that are less likely to result in strikeouts but reduce the perceived likelihood of giving up a costly hit. Now, this changes for every pitcher as every pitcher possesses their own arsenal with varying levels of command over their pitches. However, simple statistics can allow for pitchers to understand which pitches they should target in each count and to each hitter. Whether it be in-zone %, Strike%, SWISS % (Swing and Miss), each of these numbers allows a pitcher to make the best pitches based on the data that supports it.
Take for example an outing I had during this season. It was the top of the 5th inning, in which our team jumped to an early lead of 3-0. As I approached my pitch count with the game having gone stale and feeling closer than it did at the beginning of the outing, I wanted to finish the inning clean. Now if you were in my situation, how would you have approached it?
The way I thought, with the three hitters due up in the bottom half of the order, I thought pitch to my strengths while staying in the zone. On that specific night, breaking ball X and breaking ball Y, were in zone more than 55% of the time. Breaking ball Z was not performing as well and the split-changeup was out of the equation with an inconsistent shape and my own failure to make it competitive. After walking the leadoff hitter, I did not have to change my plan much. Even though the game started to feel closer and fatigue started to set in, my strengths did not change nor become my weaknesses in the matter of one at bat. I quickly got two strikeouts and when the fourth hitter came up to bat the leadoff walk was caught stealing at some point in the at bat. So that’s how I pitched, both breaking balls, in any order, twice in a row, three times in a row, and fastballs to change looks and get them off the sit breaking ball approach. Now had that been the middle of the order, in a 3-2 game after a leadoff walk, would I have changed maybe to a defensive mindset in an attempt to mitigate each hitter and attack what scouting has shown to be their weaknesses. I really think it changes inning to inning. So many pitchers I have played with never take a look at another lineup. And so many fill notebooks of things they pickup from previous meetings, heat maps, stats, and first-hand accounts. On that specific night I felt that I had momentum and did not feel the need to change what had already worked for 4 innings.
Now the same goes for hitters and their approaches. TruMedia and other scouting services have made it easy for hitters and hitting coaches to group the arsenals of pitchers to those that are similar. They can often classify a pitcher as a north-south guy or an east-west guy, depending on the shapes of their pitches and how their arsenal works. This allows hitters to “push” an east-west sinker, slider guy up in the zone to where his pitches do not perform as well. Same goes for pushing a north-south guy down in the zone to where his arsenal may not perform as well. Hitters can make decisions based on the game, pitch type and pitcher, while managers can accurately construct lineups for the best matchups. It would seem as if every decision made in this game is based on assessing risk, minimizing it, and using the multitude of data readily available to make those decisions easier.
Organizations in the MLB like the Tampa Bay Rays, Houston Astros, and Baltimore Orioles take a more analytical approach compared to many others in helping aid these decisions. However, that is also when we see managers not put on the bunt sign and allow their hitters, based on batted ball data, expected batting average on balls in play, and more. So my question to you all, based on what you may have learned, how do you think teams, managers and players use loss aversion based on their own decisions or do you think their decisions are made easier because of all the data we, and Major League organizations, have at our fingertips?
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